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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the denial of 
a claim for benefits under a Long-Term Disability Plan 
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., by a Plan participant 
suffering from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome ("CFS") was 
arbitrary and capricious. We hold that, in the 
circumstances present here, it was. We will therefore affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 




George Mitchell ("Mitchell"), then an employee of 
Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak"), first began suffering 
from persistent coughs, sore throats, fever, and extreme 
fatigue in the fall of 1988. He consulted a family physician 
and an infectious disease specialist, but neither could find 
any medical explanation for his persistent fatigue and other 
symptoms. On January 30, 1989, Dr. Gerald Gordon of the 
Geisinger Medical Center diagnosed Mitchell with "chronic 
fatiguing illness," not explained by any "clear infectious 
cause." The intermittent flu-like symptoms and chronic 
overwhelming fatigue persisted. 
 
As a result of his chronic fatigue, Mitchell stopped 
working in January 1989. He received short-term disability 
benefits from Kodak until June 26, 1989, when his 
eligibility for short-term benefits expired. Mitchell then 
applied for long-term disability benefits under Kodak's 
Long-Term Disability Plan (the "Plan"), an "employee welfare 
benefit plan" governed by ERISA. According to the terms of 
the Plan, a participant is eligible to receive long-term 
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disability ("LTD") benefits if he, inter alia, suffers from a 
disability that renders him "totally and continuously unable 
to engage in any substantial Gainful Work1 for which he is, 
or becomes, reasonably qualified by education, training, or 
experience." Plan § 2.06, App. at 12.2 
 
Metropolitan Life Insurance ("MLI"), the claims 
administrator under the Plan, reviewed Mitchell's medical 
records and denied his claim for LTD benefits in September 
1989. Mitchell sought reconsideration, and MLI affirmed 
the denial of benefits. In accordance with the terms of the 
Plan, Mitchell appealed MLI's decision to the Plan 
Administrator at Kodak. After reviewing Mitchell's claim file, 
the Administrator affirmed the denial of benefits on the 
ground that Mitchell had failed to provide "objective medical 
evidence that [his] condition made [him] totally and 
continuously unable to engage in any substantial gainful 
work for which [he was] qualified as of June 26, 1989." 
Letter of January 17, 1992, App. at 24. 
 
Mitchell then brought this ERISA action to challenge the 
Administrator's decision under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), 
which allows an ERISA plan participant to bring a civil 
action to recover benefits due him under the terms of the 
plan. Mitchell alleged that he suffered from a disability as 
defined in the Plan as of June 26, 1989, and thus was and 
is entitled to LTD benefits under the Plan. 
 
Mitchell and Kodak filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. Although both parties had assumed that the 
district court would review the Administrator's denial of 
Mitchell's claim under an "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard, the court instead conducted a de novo review 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Gainful Work is paid employment." Plan § 2.11, App. at 13. 
 
2. The Plan also requires that a participant seeking LTD benefits (1) have 
one year of continuous or adjusted service before the last day worked 
before the onset of disability; (2) have not reached normal retirement 
date; (3) have a disability that did not result from an act of war or 
participation in an insurrection, rebellion, or riot; (4) apply for Primary 
Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits; and (5) remain under the 
care of a licensed physician. Plan § 4.01, App. at 16-17. There is no 
dispute that Mitchell met all of these requirements when he applied for 
benefits. 
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because the copy of the Plan submitted by the parties3 
contained no language granting the Administrator 
discretion to determine a Plan participant's eligibility for 
benefits. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101 (1989); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare and Pension 
Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991). The court found 
that the evidence clearly showed that Mitchell was suffering 
from CFS in June 1989, but was insufficient to 
demonstrate that his CFS rendered Mitchell totally unable 
to engage in any substantial gainful work at that time. The 
court also concluded, however, that there was insufficient 
evidence to find that Mitchell was not totally disabled by 
his CFS. To resolve the issue, the court remanded the 
matter to the Administrator for reconsideration after 
supplementation of the record with additional information 
on Mitchell's ability to engage in gainful work on June 26, 
1989. 
 
On remand, Mitchell submitted to the Administrator a 
letter from his physician, Dr. Nelson Gantz, dated August 
18, 1994, which explained how Mitchell's persistent CFS 
symptoms rendered him unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful work. After reviewing this supplemental 
information "and again reviewing the entirety of the claims 
administrator's file," the Administrator reaffirmed his denial 
of Mitchell's claim for LTD benefits. Letter of Apr. 12, 1995, 
App. at 192-93. The Administrator insisted that Dr. Gantz's 
letter, which was written in the present tense, "failed to 
shed any new light on Mr. Mitchell's condition as of June 
26, 1989." Id. at 193. The Administrator concluded, once 
again, that Mitchell "ha[d] failed to provide any objective 
medical evidence that his condition made him totally and 
continuously unable to engage in any substantial gainful 
work for which he was qualified as of June 26, 1989." Id. 
 
Mitchell then filed with the district court a Petition to Re- 
Open Motion for Summary Judgment. Kodak, in opposition 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Mitchell attached a copy of the Plan dated January 1, 1990 to his 
Complaint filed May 7, 1993. In its Answer, Kodak "admit[ted] that the 
copy attached to the complaint is a true and correct copy of the Plan." 
Defendant's Answer ¶ 4, App. at 25-26. In fact, the Plan had been 
amended effective April 14, 1991. 
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to the Petition, submitted 1991 Plan Amendments that 
granted the Administrator "discretionary authority to 
determine all questions arising in the administration, 
interpretation and application of the plan" and argued that 
the Amendments, which had been in effect when the 
Administrator finally denied Mitchell's claim in January 
1992, precluded the district court from reviewing the 
Administrator's decision de novo. The district court, 
although recognizing that the Plan Amendments indeed 
granted the Administrator discretionary authority to 
administer the Plan, again conducted a de novo review. The 
court interpreted this court's decision in Luby v. Teamsters 
Health, Welfare and Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176 
(3d Cir. 1991), to require de novo review of all fact-based 
decisions by ERISA plan administrators. Dec. 14, 1995 Op. 
at 9-11. Pursuant to its de novo review, the court granted 
summary judgment for Mitchell on the ground that the 
undisputed evidence demonstrated that Mitchell suffered 
from CFS that rendered him totally unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful work as of June 26, 1989 and that he 
was therefore entitled to LTD benefits under the Plan. 
Kodak appeals the grant of summary judgment, challenging 
both the district court's de novo review of the 
Administrator's decision and its conclusion that Mitchell 
was totally disabled as of June 26, 1989. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over this action under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court's grant of 
summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is 
plenary, and we apply the same test that the district court 
should have applied in the first instance. Bixler v. Central 
Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 




Kodak challenges the district court's de novo review of 
the Plan Administrator's decision and argues that the court 
should have affirmed the Administrator's decision under 
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Alternatively, 
Kodak asserts that even under de novo review, the district 
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court should have affirmed the Administrator's decision. 
Mitchell, on the other hand, argues that de novo review was 
appropriate, and, alternatively, that even under the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review he is entitled 
to summary judgment. We agree with Kodak that the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is applicable here, but 
we also find that the Administrator's decision should be 
overturned even under that deferential standard. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
ERISA does not set out the standard of review for an 
action brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B) by a participant 
alleging that he has been denied benefits to which he is 
entitled under a covered plan. However, in Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of the appropriate standard for actions challenging 
"denials of benefits based on plan interpretations." 489 U.S. 
101, 108 (1989). The Court held that "a denial of benefits 
challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a 
de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the 
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to 
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of 
the plan." Id. at 115. Where the plan affords the 
administrator discretionary authority, the administrator's 
interpretation of the plan "will not be disturbed if 
reasonable." Id. at 111.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Court also noted that "if a benefit plan gives discretion to an 
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, 
that conflict must be weighed as a `facto[r] in determining whether there 
is an abuse of discretion.' " Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
§ 187, Comment d (1959)). No conflict of interest is present here. 
Although the Plan is self-insured, the Plan assets are administered by a 
trustee pursuant to a trust agreement that provides that funds "may not 
be used for any purpose other than for the exclusive benefit of persons 
entitled to benefits under the Plan and for reasonable expenses of 
administering the Plan." Plan § 8.01. Therefore, because Kodak "incurs 
no direct expense as a result of the allowance of benefits, nor does it 
benefit directly from the denial or discontinuation of benefits," Abnathya 
v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993), there is no 
conflict of interest sufficient to justify heightened review of the 
Administrator's decision. 
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In Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust 
Funds, we held that Firestone's de novo standard of review 
applies to decisions based on plan administrators' factual 
determinations as well as decisions based on their 
interpretations of the terms of the plan. 944 F.2d 1176, 
1183-84 (3d Cir. 1991). We agreed with the Seventh Circuit 
that "the Court [in Firestone] intended de novo review where 
administrators were not granted discretion, regardless of 
whether the denials under review were based on plan 
interpretations." Id. at 1183 (quoting Petrilli v. Drechsel, 910 
F.2d 1441, 1446 (7th Cir. 1990)). We were 
 
not convinced by the rationale of ... courts [of appeals] 
holding that administrator's [sic] factual 
determinations should be subject to deferential review. 
Plan administrators are not governmental agencies who 
are frequently granted deferential review because of 
their acknowledged expertise. Administrators may be 
laypersons appointed under the plan, sometimes 
without any legal, accounting, or other training 
preparing them for their responsible positions, often 
without any experience in or understanding of the 
complex problems arising under ERISA, and ... little 
knowledge of the rules of evidence or legal procedures 
to assist them in factfinding. 
 
Id. Thus, we concluded that, like plan administrators' 
decisions based on plan interpretations, "[an] ERISA plan 
administrator's fact-based determinations are to be 
reviewed de novo unless the plan specifically provides that 
his determinations of fact be given deference or grants the 
administrator the authority to make determinations 
between death benefit claimants." Id. at 1187. 
 
The district court mistakenly relied on Luby to hold that, 
although the Kodak Plan "plainly vests discretionary 
authority in the plan administrator," Dec. 14, 1995 Op. at 
8, de novo review of the denial of Mitchell's claim was 
appropriate because the denial was "based solely on [a] 
factual determination[ ]" of whether Mitchell was totally 
disabled at the time he applied for LTD benefits. Id. at 9. As 
we have explained, Luby did not hold that district courts 
must exercise de novo review over all factual 
determinations by ERISA plan administrators. Rather, it 
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held that de novo review of factual determinations, like plan 
interpretations, is appropriate if the plan does not grant the 
plan administrator discretion to make those determinations. 
Thus, the appropriate standard of review here depends on 
"whether the terms of this Plan grant the Administrator 
discretion to act as a finder of facts" to decide whether 
Mitchell was "totally disabled" by CFS on June 26, 1989, 
the date as of which he applied for LTD benefits. See Luby, 
944 F.2d at 1180. 
 
Section 8.03 of the Plan provides: 
 
In reviewing the claim of any participant, the Plan 
Administrator shall have full discretionary authority to 
determine all questions arising in the administration, 
interpretation and application of the plan. In all such 
cases, the Plan Administrator's decision shall be final 
and binding upon all parties. 
 
Giving this language its ordinary meaning, we conclude 
that the broad grant of discretionary authority to the 
Administrator is sufficient to preclude de novo review of 
both interpretative and factual determinations made in the 
course of applying the benefit provisions of the Plan to a 
particular application for benefits. Because fact-based 
determinations of eligibility for LTD benefits are certainly 
one of the "questions arising in the administration, 
interpretation and application of the plan," and the 
Administrator's decisions regarding such questions are 
"final and binding," the Plan clearly provides that eligibility 
determinations are to be afforded deference.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Our conclusion is consistent with our circuit jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying arbitrary and 
capricious standard to plan administrator's fact-based decision not to 
waive penalty provision where plan provided administrator with 
"discretion and authority to interpret and construe the provisions of the 
Plan, to determine eligibility to participate in the Plan, ... and to decide 
such questions as may arise in connection with the operation of the 
Plan"); Stoetzner v. United States Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard to administrator's denial of 
pension and severance benefits on basis of factual determination that 
claimants were afforded comparable pension benefits after sale of plan 
sponsor where plan provided that "[the administrator] shall ... decide all 
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Mitchell argues that the Administrator's authority to 
determine questions arising in the "application" of the Plan 
does not entitle his decisions to deference because it "is no 
more than a vesting of authority to interpret the provisions 
of the plan." Mitchell Br. at 5. We find this argument 
untenable. First, § 8.03 specifically provides the 
Administrator with the power of "interpretation," and if the 
term "application" merely afforded that same power it would 
be entirely superfluous. Second, we think that "application" 
of the Plan, like judicial "application" of the law, must 
encompass the resolution of factual disputes as well as the 
interpretation of the governing provisions of the Plan. Thus, 
we conclude that the Plan Administrator's decision to deny 
Mitchell LTD benefits should be reviewed under an 
arbitrary and capricious standard. 
 
B. Denial of Benefits 
 
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, "the district 
court may overturn a decision of the Plan administrator 
only if it is `without reason, unsupported by the evidence or 
erroneous as a matter of law.' " Abnathya v. Hoffman 
LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Adamo 
v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 720 F. Supp. 491, 500 (W.D. Pa. 
1989)). "This scope of review is narrow, and`the court is 
not free to substitute its own judgment for that of the 
[administrator] in determining eligibility for plan benefits.' " 
Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 (quoting Lucash v. Strick Corp., 602 
F. Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
questions arising out of and relating to the administration of [the 
plan].... The decisions of the [administrator] shall be final and conclusive 
as to all questions of interpretation and application of [the plan] and to 
all other matters arising in the administration thereof."); Scarinci v. 
Ciccia, 880 F. Supp. 359 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (applying arbitrary and 
capricious standard to administrator's mixed fact- and plan- 
interpretation-based decision to deny short-term disability benefits under 
plan that required employee to provide "satisfactory" evidence of 
disability to administrator with discretionary authority "to ... determine 
conclusively for all parties all questions arising in the administration of 
the Plan"). 
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1. The Plan 
 
In determining whether the Plan Administrator's decision 
to deny Mitchell LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious, 
we begin with the Plan itself, since an ERISA plan 
administrator must "discharge his duties with respect to a 
plan ... in accordance with the documents and instruments 
governing the plan insofar as such documents and 
instruments are consistent with the provisions of [ERISA]." 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). Section 4.01 of the Plan provides 
that in order to qualify for LTD benefits, a participant must, 
inter alia, "[m]eet the definition of Disability in Section 2.06."6 
Section 2.06 in turn provides: 
 
"Disability" for the purpose of this Plan is a condition 
fulfilling these requirements: 
 
a) A Participant is totally and continuously unable 
to engage in any substantial Gainful Work for which 
he is, or becomes, reasonably qualified by education, 
training, or experience, and 
 
b) The disability: 
 
 1) has lasted for a continuous period of 26 weeks 
inclusive of time during which Short-Term 
Disability benefits and Workers Compensation 
Income Replacement benefits were paid (except 
where a Participant is involuntarily terminated 
from the Employer as a result of a layoff, a 
divestiture, or a special separation plan), or 
 
 2) has lasted for less than 26 weeks, but can 
reasonably be expected to last for a total of at least 
26 weeks, or 
 
 3) is expected to result in death. 
 
LTD benefits under the Plan are not automatic, and a 
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that he 
qualifies for benefits. See Plan §§ 4.01 and 4.02; Kodak 
Employee Handbook, App. at 112. Thus, the Plan required 
that Mitchell, in order to obtain LTD benefits, show that as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The other eligibility requirements are described supra, note 2. 
Mitchell's satisfaction of those requirements is not in dispute. 
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of June 26, 1989, he was totally and continuously unable 
to engage in any substantial gainful work for which he was 
reasonably qualified. 
 
2. Mitchell's Record Support 
 
To determine whether Mitchell has carried his burden, we 
look to the record as a whole. Cf. Smith v. Califano, 637 
F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that court reviewing 
denial of Social Security disability benefits "retain[s] a 
responsibility to scrutinize the entire record and to reverse 
or remand if the ... decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence"). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review, the "whole" record consists of that evidence that 
was before the administrator when he made the decision 
being reviewed. See Luby, 944 F.2d at 1184 n.8; Woolsey v. 
Marion Laboratories, Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 
1991); Voliva v. Seafarers Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 196 
(4th Cir. 1988). Here, because the Administrator made two 
decisions--the January 17, 1992 denial that precipitated 
this lawsuit and the April 12, 1995 re-affirmation of that 
denial that preceded the district court's grant of summary 
judgment and this appeal--there is some dispute regarding 
what constitutes the "whole" record. 
 
The January 17, 1992, letter communicating the 
Administrator's initial decision to deny LTD benefits advised 
Mitchell that if he had additional "objective medical 
evidence that [he] was disabled within the meaning of [the 
Plan] as of June 26, 1989," he should submit it and the 
Administrator would "reopen [his] file." App. at 24. 
Consistent with that position, Kodak does not ask us to 
review and overturn the district court's order directing 
reconsideration by the Administrator after an opportunity 
to supplement the record. Nevertheless, Kodak asks us to 
review the district court's subsequent judgment of 
December 14, 1995, directing payment of benefits, on the 
basis of the record as it existed before supplementation. We 
decline to do so. In the absence of a successful attack on 
the order requiring reconsideration, our only appropriate 
course is to review the district court's December 14, 1995, 
judgment based on the legally relevant record then before 
it. Given our conclusion that the district court should have 
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asked only whether the Administrator's denial was arbitrary 
and capricious, on the basis of the record before the 
Administrator, this means that the relevant record on 
appeal is the evidence before the Administrator at the time 
of his final denial on April 12, 1995. 
 
The undisputed evidence in his claim file as of April 12, 
1995, shows that as of June 26, 1989, Mitchell's chronic 
and unpredictable fatigue and loss of concentration made it 
impossible for him to sustain regular paid employment. 
Mitchell's medical records indicate that he began 
complaining of fatigue, fever, a persistent cough, and other 
flu-like symptoms in the fall of 1988. An infectious disease 
specialist diagnosed Mitchell with "chronic fatiguing illness" 
in January 1989, and Physician's Statements submitted in 
support of Mitchell's claim in June 1989, May 1990, and 
July 1990 all indicated that Mitchell suffered from chronic 
fatigue. Although the doctors who completed the two earlier 
Statements expressed uncertainty regarding whether 
Mitchell's fatigue rendered him "totally disabled," the third 
clearly stated that Mitchell was "totally disabled" from 
gainful employment because of his CFS.7  In 1991, the 
Social Security Administration agreed with that conclusion, 
awarding Mitchell Social Security Disability benefits after 
comprehensively reviewing his medical history and 
concluding that "[t]he medical evidence establishes that the 
claimant has severe chronic fatigue syndrome with Epstein- 
Barr Virus" and that he "lacks the residual functional 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Kodak contends that the July 1990 Physician's Statement is 
unreliable because it is internally inconsistent, indicating that Mitchell 
suffered only "No Limitation" or "Some Limitation" in performing 
activities such as sitting, standing, pushing, pulling, and spoken and 
written communication, but that he was nonetheless totally disabled 
from any occupation. We do not find this "inconsistency" dispositive. It 
seems to us to be attributable largely to the inappropriateness of the 
Physician's Statement form for evaluating disability resulting from CFS. 
CFS does not disable an individual afflicted with it from performing 
particular, isolated activities, but rather prevents him from performing 
all activities for any prolonged period of time. Thus, it is not inconsistent, 
given the characteristics of CFS, for Mitchell's doctor to conclude that 
Mitchell was totally unable to engage in substantial gainful activity, even 
though his ability to perform isolated activities such as standing, 
pushing, pulling, and communicating was only "somewhat" limited. 
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capacity to perform the physical exertion and nonexertional 
requirements of work." App. at 136. 
 
By 1993, Mitchell was under the care of Dr. Nelson 
Gantz, a doctor familiar with CFS. On September 21, 1993, 
Dr. Gantz wrote a letter to the Plan Administrator 
diagnosing Mitchell's CFS and describing his symptoms: 
 
In my opinion [ ]his illness had an acute onset and my 
impression is that Mr. Mitchell has chronic fatigue 
syndrome. 
 
 The treatment for chronic fatigue syndrome is 
symptomatic and the prognosis is unknown. Based on 
these last two items and his symptomatology it would 
make him physically incapable of increased or 
sustained activities. He cannot keep a regular schedule 
because of his constant fatigue and his loss of 
concentration. 
 
 Based on Mr. Mitchell's history, it is my opinion his 
acute onset developed in October 1988. Since chronic 
fatigue syndrome is a disease of exclusion, Mr. Mitchell 
has been extensively worked up in the past and in this 
office .... 
 
App. at 165-66. 
 
On August 18, 1994, Dr. Gantz wrote another letter that 
clarified how Mitchell's symptoms of "fatigue, fevers, joint 
pain, muscle pain, sore throats, markedly decreased 
concentration, headaches, muscle weakness and occasional 
sleep problems" disabled him from all substantial gainful 
activity: 
 
The frequency and severity of symptoms in patients 
with the Chronic Fatigue Syndrome vary greatly and 
can wax and wane. There is no pattern to the cycle, 
and unfortunately it is difficult to say when he will 
have good days or bad days.... At present, restricting 
activities is the only way to prevent exacerbation of his 
CFS symptoms. He is capable of only mild, intermittent 
activities. His ability to sustain any activity, even for a 
few hours, is unpredictable.... I feel that Mr. Mitchell is 
100% disabled at this time and work for him is out of 
the question. 
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Letter of Aug. 18, 1994, App. at 191. Dr. Gantz's letters, 
taken together with the earlier records of Mitchell's 
persistent CFS symptoms, support the proposition that 
Mitchell began suffering acute CFS symptoms in the fall of 
1988, and that his symptoms rendered--and continue to 
render--him incapable of sustaining prolonged activities, 
including any gainful employment. There is no evidence to 
the contrary. 
 
Kodak argues that because Mitchell's records contain no 
explicit doctor's statement that "Mitchell was totally 
disabled as of June 26, 1989," they fail to establish that 
Mitchell was in fact "totally disabled" by CFS on June 26, 
1989. Although it is true that the records lack such an 
explicit statement, we conclude that that alone does not 
support the Administrator's conclusion that Mitchell failed 
to show total disability as of June 26, 1989. The 
undisputed reports from Mitchell's treating physicians show 
that he began suffering CFS symptoms well before June 
1989, and Dr. Gantz's letter of August 18, 1994 clearly 
explains how those symptoms rendered Mitchell totally 
disabled from gainful work. 
 
Moreover, Mitchell's treating physicians' early difficulty 
diagnosing Mitchell's CFS and understanding how it 
disabled him from work do not support the Administrator's 
conclusion. Mitchell's CFS symptoms have remained 
consistent since before June 1989 and later, undisputed 
evidence from a doctor more knowledgeable about the 
diagnosis and symptomatology of CFS clearly supports 
Mitchell's contention that CFS has rendered him totally 
unable to engage in any substantial gainful work since 
January 1989. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Sisco v. 
United States Dep't of Health & Human Services, in which 
the patient's CFS had gone undiagnosed from 1983 to 
1989, 
 
[u]nder the facts of this case, the early examinations 
cannot be considered as contradicting or rebutting 
[Plaintiff 's] recent diagnosis.... [C]hronic fatigue 
syndrome was not even recognized as a disease until 
1988, and the first technique to diagnose it was not 
published until that same year.... It is highly unlikely 
that any of the physicians who examined Plaintiff prior 
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to the Mayo Clinic [which diagnosed her] would have 
considered or even been aware of chronic fatigue 
syndrome. The government has not cited to a single 
physician who examined Plaintiff after the Mayo Clinic 
or in light of the medical community's new 
understanding of chronic fatigue syndrome who 
contradicted or in any way questioned the conclusions 
of the Mayo Clinic and her treating physician. 
 
 Moreover, because chronic fatigue syndrome is 
diagnosed partially through a process of elimination, 
an extended medical history of "nothing-wrong" 
diagnoses is not unusual for a patient who is 
ultimately found to be suffering from the disease. The 
Mayo Clinic and her treating physician considered 
Plaintiff's entire medical history--including all the 
failed attempts to diagnose--in making their 
assessments. Finally, in a purely linguistic sense, an 
early report that "I am unable to find the cause" does 
not contradict a later report that "I have now found the 
cause." The statements together demonstrate an 
evolution rather than a contradiction. 
 
10 F.3d 739, 745 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 
Here, the doctors who examined Mitchell between 1988 
and 1990 were apparently unfamiliar with CFS, see, e.g., 
Physician's Progress Notes of June 6, 1989, App. at 60 
("[Mitchell] brought in some literature from CBC [sic; CDC 
(Centers for Disease Control)?] on a chronic fatigue 
syndrome. He may well have this, but I don't know how to 
prove it."), and thus were unable to declare with confidence 
that he was totally disabled by the disease. However, Dr. 
Gantz's letters of September 1993 and August 1994 dispel 
the confusion evidenced in the earlier medical records, and 
make clear that Mitchell's CFS, though misunderstood, 
clearly disabled him from all substantial gainful work as of 
June 26, 1989. 
 
3. The Administrator's Decision 
 
According to the record before us, the Administrator 
denied Mitchell's claim for LTD benefits because Mitchell 
had failed to tender "objective medical evidence" that he 
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was unable to engage in any substantial gainful work as of 
June 26, 1989.8 We hold that, in this context, it was 
arbitrary and capricious for the Administrator to deny 
Mitchell LTD benefits for this reason. 
 
The Administrator's denial letters are terse, and we are 
not altogether certain of their meaning. However, we find 
the denial arbitrary and capricious under either of the 
possible meanings we can divine. The Administrator may 
have meant that Mitchell had tendered insufficient evidence 
to persuade the Administrator that Mitchell experienced 
chronic and unpredictable fatigue and loss of concentration 
or that he experienced those symptoms to a sufficient 
extent to foreclose his holding down paid employment. If 
that was the Administrator's meaning, his denial of benefits 
on that ground was arbitrary and capricious because the 
undisputed facts of record are to the contrary. As we have 
already described, the undisputed evidence from Mitchell's 
physicians indicates that Mitchell has suffered severe CFS 
symptoms that have precluded him from engaging in any 
substantial gainful work since January 1989. Kodak has 
identified no more "objective" evidence that Mitchell could 
have submitted, in addition to his doctors' observations, to 
support his claim that his fatigue and loss of concentration 
were sufficiently severe to prevent him from engaging in 
gainful work. 
 
Because the Administrator cited a lack of "objective 
medical evidence," as opposed to merely "objective 
evidence," we think it more likely that the Administrator 
meant that Mitchell had failed to submit clinical evidence 
establishing the etiology of the chronic and unpredictable 
fatigue and loss of concentration that disabled him from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See Letter of Jan. 17, 1992, App. at 24 ("The file indicates that you are 
suffering from fatigue, but does not contain objective medical evidence 
that your condition made you totally and continuously unable to engage 
in any substantial gainful work for which you were qualified as of June 
26, 1989.") (emphasis in original); Letter of Apr. 12, 1995, App. at 193 
(informing Mitchell's attorney that denial of benefits was affirmed 
because "you and your client have failed to provide any objective medical 
evidence that his condition made him totally and continuously unable to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity for which he was qualified as 
of June 26, 1989.") (emphasis in original). 
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working. Although in some contexts it may not be arbitrary 
and capricious to require clinical evidence of the etiology of 
allegedly disabling symptoms in order to verify that there is 
no malingering, we conclude that it was arbitrary and 
capricious to require such evidence in the context of this 
Plan and CFS. 
 
The Plan requires that a claimant for LTD benefits "[m]eet 
the definition of Disability," i.e. be "totally and continuously 
unable to engage in any substantial Gainful Work for which 
he is, or becomes, reasonably qualified" for at least 26 
weeks. See Plan §§ 2.06, 4.01. Nowhere does the Plan state 
that a claimant must provide clinical evidence of the 
etiology of the "condition" that renders him disabled. Cf. 
Dewitt v. Penn-Del Directory Corp., 106 F.3d 514, 520 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (administrator's discretionary interpretation of 
plan "may not controvert the plain language of the [plan] 
document") (citing Gaines v. Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 753 
F.2d 288, 289 (3d Cir. 1985)). All that the Plan required 
was that Mitchell show that he was in fact "disabled" as of 
June 26, 1989, and this he did. See supra Part II-B-2. 
 
Moreover, it was impermissible for the Administrator to 
imply an additional "clinical evidence of etiology" 
requirement not specified in the Plan document in the 
context of CFS. It is now widely-recognized in the medical 
and legal communities that "there is no `dipstick' laboratory 
test for chronic fatigue syndrome." Sisco v. United States 
Dep't of Health & Human Services, 10 F.3d 739, 744 (10th 
Cir. 1993). Because the disease, although universally- 
recognized as a severe disability, has no known etiology, 
see, e.g., Rose v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1994), 
it would defeat the legitimate expectations of participants in 
the Kodak Plan to require those with CFS to make a 
showing of clinical evidence of such etiology as a condition 
of eligibility for LTD benefits. Thus, it was arbitrary and 
capricious for the Administrator to deny Mitchell benefits 





In accordance with the foregoing, we hold that the Kodak 
Plan Administrator's decision to deny Mitchell's claim for 
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LTD benefits was "arbitrary and capricious." We will affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment for Mitchell. 
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